







Cultural outlaws, political organizers 
Julie Stephens 
One of the least contestable features of postmodernism is its refusal to accept the 
hierarchy of value and  élitism implied  in the d istinction between high culture and 
popular culture. In the genealogies frequently circulated , postmodernism is pictured  
in opposition to two versions of modernism: a modernism codified  and  conquered  
by the academy and museum, incorporated  as a high cultural artefact precisely 
because of its d isengagement with the popular or commercial; and  a modernism 
which lost its adversary status and  entered  mainstream chiefly through its 
contamination by mass production and  culture industry.1  
Leaving aside the paradoxical nature of these observations, Jameson and  others 
identify as a central premise of postmodern art, literature, architecture or critical 
theory the effacement of key boundaries or separations, 'most notably the erosion of 
the older d istinction between high culture and  so-called  mass or popular culture.2 
This elimination of boundaries is executed  not through 'quotations' from the 
popular, like a Joyce or a Mahler might have done (to use Jameson's examples), but 
through the incorporation of such quotes 'to the point where the line between high 
art and  commercial forms seems increasingly d ifficult to draw'.3 Hence the 
postmodern fascination with advertising, motels, B-grade Hollywood movies, 'T.V. 
Reader' s Digest culture', and  the like.4  
However, the exploitation of this fascination as an oppositional cultural strategy was 
not unique to postmodernism. The anti-d isciplinary politics of the sixties 
counterculture was also based  on deploying captivating popular culture themes in 
its language of protest. As already noted , the figure of the 'outlaw', borrowed from 
Hollywood film, became the conscious archetype for the anti-authoritarian 
revolutionary both parodied  and  revered  by groups like the Diggers or the Weather 
Underground.  
According to Hoffman, while the cultural view creates outlaws, p olitics only breeds 
organizers.5 As a further example, take Rubin's comments:  
'I d idn't get my ideas from Mao, Lenin or Ho Chi Minh', he brags, 'I got my  
ideas from the Lone Ranger'.6 
And, in another context, the centrality of the popular rad ical imagination of the 
sixties is also evident:  
I am a child  of Amerika [sic]. 
If I'm ever sent to Death Row for my revolutionary 'crimes, I'll order as my 
last meal: a hamburger, french fries and  a coke. 
I d ig big cities ...  
I love to read  the sports pages and  gossip columns, listen to the rad io and  
watch color TV ... 
I groove on Hollywood movies -- even bad  ones. 
I speak only one language -- English. 
I love rock 'n roll.7  
In the intersection between the counterculture and  the New Left, attempts were 
made to fashion a new politics from popular ingredients. Moreover, importing these 
ingredients into the domain of politics represented  not so much an attack on high 
modernism as on 'high Marxism' -- in either its old  or New Left guises. 'Quotations' 
from the popular were incorporated  as subversive elements in a politics which 
aimed to counter the piety of more conventional Left strategies, to taint the purity of 
movements supposedly based  on selfless ideals and  noble ancestry, and  to playfully 
incorporate seductive items from the everyday into an arena often noted  for its 
autonomy and specialization. 
The anti-d isciplinary assault on the autonomy of politics and  culture was largely 
prefigured  by wider political-economic developments. Efforts to confuse the lines 
between politics, art, culture and  everyday life d id  not arise in a vacuum. The status 
of these categories and  of 'the popular' itself had  already been altered  by post -war 
developments in communications technology and  the related expansion of a 
prosperous consumer culture.  
New definitions of the relationship between popular culture and  a dominant high 
culture were fostered  via the medium of television. And just as a once adversary 
modemism was incorporated  into the m ainstream through advertising, changes in 
technologies of production and  the creation of mass markets in the fifties,8 so a once 
marginal protest trad ition embodied  in folk music and  culture was commercialized  
in the sixties not least through an expanding record  industry.  
In one sense, then, the anti-d isciplinary revelling in the popular was merely a 
reflection of broader cultural changes So in harking back to the Lone Ranger as a 
begetter of rad ical ideas figures like Jerry Rubin illustrate that in the sixties a new 
political memory was in the making This is well expressed  in a notable incident 
which took place on December 1966 at a mass meeting about a campus strike in 
Berkeley. Reporting at the time in the San Francisco Examiner, Lyn Ludlow records 
that after six days of demonstrations the students broke into song. She then notes 
incredulously that: 'They d id  NOT sing We Shall Overcome. They sang Yellow 
Submarine'!9  
Others have also documented  this telling event. Todd Gitlin depicts this 
spontaneous outburst in part as evidence of the bridges being built between 'freaks' 
and  'politicos' at Berkeley:  
At a mass meeting about a campus strike, someone started  singing the old  
union standby, 'Solidarity Forever'. Voices stumbled , few knew the words. 
Then someone started 'Yellow Submarine,' and  the entire roomful rollicked  
into it, chorus after chorus. With a bit of effort, the Beatles' song could  be 
taken as the communion of hippies and  activists, students and  non -students, 
all who at long last felt they could  express their beloved  single-hearted 
community.10  
This episode epitomizes a rather unselfconscious turn to popular culture and  is in 
contrast to the more deliberate manipulation of popular culture themes we see in the 
later antics of the Yippies. However, the incident also marks a significant historical 
moment where an essentially commercial product (the Beatles' song) overshadows 
and is experienced  as more powerful, resonant and  palpable than the actual heritage 
of the American Left.  
My point here is about a change in historical memory; not about the 'heritage of the 
American Left' as an unproblematic notion. Obviously, this 'heritage' involves a 
mythmaking of its own. In an interesting review  essay of John Sayles' Union Dues, 
Marianne DeKoven observes that one of these myths revolves around a supposed  
continuity in the American Left and  that sixties rad icals were 'fighting the same 
good fight against the same oppression that the American miner s fought in l9l4'.11 
The singing of 'Yellow Submarine' marks a departure from such myths.  
As Gitlin suggests it is indeed  possible to see in this collective singing an expression 
of the students' desire for a 'single-hearted community' and  he quotes from a leaflet 
written at the time by Michael Rossman, who described  this singing as a fusion of 
'head , heart and  hands'.12 Yet this would  also be true if they had sung 'Solidarity 
Forever'! What sets this incident apart and  thereby guarantees its retelling in 
retrospective accounts of the period  is both the curious choice of song in an 
otherwise conventional form of political protest and  the students' inability to 
remember the 'old  union standby' and/ or their lack of enthusiasm for it.  
This makes it possible equally to view the singing of 'Yellow Submarine' (the song 
itself being a fairly impenetrable collage) as a rudimentary' postmodern moment, 
signalling the demise of a certain kind  of political memory where, to use Jameson's 
words: 'the past as "referent" finds itself gradually bracketed , and  then effaced  
altogether ...'.13  
It is interesting to reflect on whether this commercial song would  have been so 
readily embraced  in a country with a d ifferent and  perhaps more deeply embedded  
Left trad ition. For example, it is hard  to imagine 'Yellow Submarine' replacing the 
'Internationale' at a demonstration in France in the sixties. This is where the cultural 
and  historical specificities of sixties movements d iffer  markedly. In America, 
particularly after McCarthyism, the political memory could  hard ly be described  as 
socialist. This incident also tells us something about a certain attitude to 
commercialized  popular culture which may have been more uncritical in Amer ica 
than in Europe at the time.  
Doubtless, the Yippies were the sixties rad icals who most thoroughly problematized  
the notion of a referent. Yippie rituals and  writings repeatedly emphasised  the extent 
to which there is nothing but myth in contemporary society. Political activity 
including their own was invariably depicted  as being all about d istortion myth -
making and  mediated  images. And  to theatrically illustrate these points popular 
culture themes were used  by the Yippies to unsettle familiar d istinctions between 
fantasy and  reality The line separating politics from art was blurred  because, like 
soap operas or advertisements or other items from popular culture, politics also 
involved  myth-making, and  was in essence, according to this logic, a fabrication .  
Once again, the anti-d isciplinary politics of the Yippies departed  from both the old  
and  New Left, which likewise drew on a fine trad ition of identifying political 
misrepresentation and  falsehood elsewhere but stopped short of extending this 
critique to include their own practices.  
The Yippies thus turned  conventional Left interpretations of ideology on their heads 
and  instead  maintained  the position that the more d istortion the better in politics. 
Instances of this conviction being broadcast are apparent in many of the extracts 
from the Yippie writings already cited  in preceding chapters. Similarly, Abbie 
Hoffman's d iscussion of the relative merits of the popular Chicago tabloid  the Daily 
News and  by comparison the high cultural artefact of The New York Times ends up  
offering a very positive view of media exaggeration. Hoffman asks which is closer to 
the truth: the Daily News description of 'Pot smoking d irty beatnik pinko sex-crazy 
Vietnik so-called  Yippies', or The New York Times rendering of the Yippies as 
'members of the newly formed Youth International Party (YIP)')?14  
Hoffman in has no qualms about declaring his love for the former, hailing the Daily 
News as being the closest thing to TV ('it [even] looks like a TV set')15 and  hence, in 
his opinion, closer to the fake reality of American society in the late sixties.  
Hoffman's homage to media exaggeration is not without its irony. However the 
further he develops the contrast between the two newspapers the more the irony 
seems to d iminish:  
I don't consider [the Daily News] the enemy, in the same way that I don't 
consider George Wallace the enemy. Corporate liberalism, Robert Kennedy, 
Xerox, David  Susskind , The New York Times, Harvard  University -- that is 
where the real power in America lies, and  it's the rejection of those 
institutions and  symbols that d istinguishes rad icals.16 
Mass culture was therefore not the adversary of the rad icalism to which Hoffman 
refers Moreover, the chimera-like qualities of popular culture, its talent for 
overstatement and  ability to magnify and  expand the 'real' was portrayed  as 
somehow liberating and  therefore a legitimate focus for countercultural p olitics.  
But this was no artless celebration of the popular. In fact the relationship between 
the Yippies and  mass culture was double: the Yippies, on the one hand, relishing in 
the fantasy world  produced by popular culture and  embracing it as being 
intrinsically antagonistic towards the dominant institutions of the day, and , on the 
other, obliquely drawing attention to the role of the popular in making everything 
appear equally as illusory. Ironically, the Yippies d id  their bit to encourage the 
media preference for spectacular politics which pushed conventional Left and  social 
movement protests to the margins.  
In many respects, the quotations from the popular which helped  shape the language 
of an anti-d isciplinary politics in the sixties simultaneously expressed  modernist and  
postmodernist tendencies. If, in this instance, we take as valid  one of Marshall 
Berman's definitions of modernism, as 'the variety of visions and  ideas that aim to 
make men and women the subjects as well as the objects of modernization, to give 
them the power to change the world  that is changing them, to make their way 
through the maelstrom and make it their own',17 then even the most anti-
d isciplinary of groups d id  not relinquish such aims.  
Embedded in their flamboyant use of motifs from popular culture was a critique of 
the dehumanizing nature of the mass culture industry: its uniformity absurd ity and  
falsehood. The cultures of so-called  élite and  mass society were therefore not entirely 
blended into an equivalently inconsequential mix. Insinuated  in the anti-d isciplinary 
attempts to erase the d istinction between high art an d  popular culture were a set of 
value judgements about both. And from the tacit critique of popular culture came 
the modernist promise implied  in Yippie forms of political intervention: by 
amplifying and  enacting the d istortion at the heart of mass society  (and  linking this 
deception to high culture as well), transcendence, authenticity and  change would  
become possible.  
Like other forms of sixties rad icalism, the anti-d iscip linary politics of the Yippies 
shared  a commitment to the idea of 'the streets'; fa ith that there was a space outside' 
and  separate from the dominant institutions of mainstream culture. While this 
notion of the streets at times literally meant footpaths, roads and  public places where 
guerrilla theatre could  take place, at other times it took on a more metaphoric 
significance signalling an autonomous cultural sphere unclouded by the delusions of 
mass culture. According to Jameson, the very conceptions of 'negativity', 
'opposition', 'subversion', 'critique' and  'reflexivity' (the stuff of r ad ical politics) 
essentially rely on such a spatial conceptual separation . These ideas share:  
a single. fundamental spatial presupposition, which may be resumed in the 
equally time-honoured  formula of 'critical d istance'. No theory of cultural 
politics current on the Left today has been able to do without one notion or 
another of a certain minimal aesthetic d istance, of the possibility of the 
positioning of the cultural act outside the massive Being of capital, which then 
serves as an Archimedean point from which to assault this last.18 
So anti-d isciplinary ideas about such things as guerrilla theatre in the streets were in 
one sense as much predicated  on  the logic of a critical d istance -- the conviction that 
it was possible to stand  outside and  be a genuinely independent voice -- as were 
more d isciplinary forms of sixties rad icalism.  
Yet, in another and  just as compelling sense, the critical d istance of the streets and , 
alongside it the emancipatory aims of modernity were effaced  by these anti-
d isciplinary gestures. In this form of protest, nothing stood outside the popular. No 
domain of authenticity was granted  existence in high culture, Left politics o r 
elsewhere. The categories were genuinely muddled . Rather than a politics with a 
logically adversarial relationship to that which it purported ly resisted , this form of 
rad icalism suffused  itself with its opposite.  
As the Yippies and  similar groups mockingly immersed  themselves in the most 
clichéd  forms of the popular, so the possibility of d istance became more unlikely. In 
this respect quotations from the popular were increasingly emptied  of criticality; 
they were mere aesthetic embellishments in a politics which had  turned  in on itself, 
so that parody and  play became ends in themselves rather than indications of 
alternatives to what Perry Anderson has called , in another context, 'the imperial 
status-quo of a consumer capitalism'.19  
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